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“THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF EXPERTS”: IN 
DEFENCE OF THE “ELITES” OF THE SCIENCE-AND-RELIGION DEBATE 
 
Abstract 
This article takes a critical stance on John H. Evans’ 2018 book, Morals Not Knowledge: 
Recasting the Contemporary US Conflict Between Religion and Science. Highlighting the 
significance of the book for the science-and-religion debate, particularly the book’s emphasis 
on moral questions over knowledge claims revealed in social-scientific studies of the 
American public, I also suggest that the distinction between the “elites” of the academic 
science-and-religion field, and the religious “public” is insufficiently drawn. I argue that 
various nuances should be taken into account concerning the portrayal of “elites”, nuances 
which potentially change the way that “conflict” between science and religion is envisaged, 
as well as the function of the field. Similarly, I examine the ways in which the book construes 
science and religion as distinct knowledge systems, and I suggest that, from a theological 
perspective – relevant for much academic activity in science and religion – there is value in 
seeing science and religion in terms of a single knowledge system. This perspective may not 
address the public’s interest in moral questions directly – important as they are – but 
nevertheless it fulfils the academic function of advancing the frontiers of human knowledge 
and self-understanding.  
 








Readers based in the United Kingdom will immediately recognise the quotation in my title, 
probably with a groan, since it has become emblematic of the infamous Brexit debate of 2016 
onwards.i It is not only in the UK that fears of a “conspiracy of elites” have come to 
prominence in recent years: populist movements across the Western world have expressed 
distrust of academics, economists, and other professional groupings who are perceived to 
speak habitually for a liberal conscience. John H. Evans’ important new book, Morals Not 
Knowledge: Recasting the Contemporary US Conflict Between Religion and Science, does 
not comment on the populist phenomenon, still less take a side, but in discerning clear blue 
water between the American public and the academics (whom Evans calls the “elites”) in the 
science-and-religion debate, the book makes a related point, namely that the experts have 
consistently misunderstood the mood of the public, and have failed to speak in the public’s 
interest. Knowing John personally, I imagine that he might well object to my comparison 
between his book and recent political controversies like the Brexit debate; nevertheless, I 
believe that, with his challenge to the elites of the science-and-religion world (“a 
provocation”; Evans 2018, 13), he has (perhaps inadvertently) hit upon a parallel that 
warrants further attention. This is an important book for the science-and-religion field, since 
it highlights the American public’s attitude to the debate, an attitude which differs in 
significant ways from that of the elites. There is much here to reflect upon, and I focus 
especially on the challenge that Evans makes to the elites, and I go on to offer a defence, 
arguing that nevertheless these very same elites make important contributions to human self-




First, a personal reflection – a confession, if you like – relevant for seeing how I approach 
this book as a university academic who tries to balance twin vocations as a physicist and a 
theologian. Evans’ criticisms of the academic field of science and religion chimes with an 
uneasiness (sometimes embarrassment) that I have long felt myself, although my own 
uneasiness is different from that of Evans. Partly my uneasiness arises from the observation 
that the “science” with which the science-and-religion field engages is too often a kind of 
simplistic naturalism/positivism, sometimes based upon popular accounts of fundamental 
physics and evolutionary biology, but at any rate at some remove from the reality of 
professional research activity in the natural sciences. And partly it is because “religion” is 
often understood as a kind of cerebral Protestantism. This tendency to boil “science” and 
“religion” down to small areas of special interest is certainly not malicious, more due to the 
fact that dialogue in these areas has been particularly controverted, and contains many 
unresolved questions. This boiling down does come at a cost, though. First, the small areas of 
special interest become tacit representatives of the whole(s) of science and religion, and 
second, much activity in the field comes across as a thinly-veiled form of conservative-lite 
Christian apologetic, with little interest in other religious expressions, and still less in 
questions of ethics and praxis. Therefore, an opportunity is missed, I feel, to open-up one of 
the most important conversations facing the human race today, a conversation with far more 
existential, ethical, artistic and political consequences than are accommodated by the current, 
rather restrictive, shape of the science-and-religion field. From that point of view, Evans’ call 
to see the science-and-religion debate beyond the limited horizons of academics is extremely 
welcome, I feel. 
 
Admittedly, my discomfort with the academic science-and-religion field has softened since I 
started teaching the subject in recent years; I have found ways to shape the curriculum to 
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reflect more accurately how I see science being done on the ground, and to represent a 
broader diversity of religious expression. As a result, and in spite of my uneasiness with the 
field, I have come to find much of value in it, which means that I also find myself leaping to 
the defence of its “elites” in the face of Evans’ critique, of which I myself am one (but then 
so is John Evans!). Of course, it is in the nature of a major publication in the field to 
challenge as well as to illuminate, and Evans certainly does both. By illuminating the 
American public’s engagement with the science-and-religion debate as concerning moral 
conflict rather than the (widely-assumed) knowledge conflict beloved of academics in the 
field, Evans throws down the gauntlet to the elites to demonstrate their own relevance. It is 
this relevance that I particularly hope to comment upon in this review article. 
 
I will begin by summarising the argument of the book through its portrayal of the two key 
groups of stakeholders in the science-and-religion debate, the “elites” and the “public”, 
before moving on to chart some of the ways in which I support the book’s argument, and 
some of the ways in which I want to push back against the book’s portrayal of the elites.  
 
 
The “elites” and the “public” 
 
It is fundamental to the book that – as far as the science-and-religion debate is concerned – 
there is a recognisable distinction between the ways that “elites” see the debate and the ways 
that the “public” – sometimes referred to as “citizens”, or “religious citizens”, but in any case 
the American public – sees it. Evans often sub-divides the “religious public” into various 
Christian groupings pertinent to the US context such as “literalist Conservative Protestant”, 
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“Mainline”, or “Black Protestant” but his basic argument is framed in terms of the 
elite/public binary. These two groupings are straightforwardly defined: 
 
For my purposes, an elite is anyone who has a social role that allows them to influence 
the views of other people beyond their immediate acquaintances and family members 
on the issue under debate. So, obviously all academics are potentially elites, as are 
scientists, politicians, clergy, theologians, church officials, journalists, pundits, TV and 
movie producers, and leaders of social movements. The public, or citizens as I will 
often call them, are all of the other members of the public who lack this power. 
Someone could be elite in one context but not in another (Evans 2018, 6). 
 
In this context, an elite is a generator of ideas relevant to the science-and-religion debate, and 
who occupies a social role which provides a platform for them to express their ideas to the 
public. Whether or not those ideas influence public opinion, though, is another matter, and 
here the book makes a counter-intuitive but important move. Against the common tendency 
to lionise elites as the only people who really matter in any area of public concern (like the 
science-and-religion debate), Evans points out that it is the public who are the most important 
term in the equation. The elites may write and speak of their ideas to many people in many 
circles, but the elites will have no power to sway opinion or to enact change in society unless 
the non-elites (i.e. the public) take heed of their ideas and possess them for themselves, 
perhaps even to the extent of acting upon these ideas. In other words, the elites can achieve 
little in societal terms without support from the public. For that reason, Evans (2018, 6-7) 
explains that it is more important to understand what the public thinks about the science-and-
religion debate than what the elites think. And crucially, he finds a difference here between 
the elites and the public:  
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It has long been claimed that one source of conflict between science and society is the 
religious citizens who are inevitably in conflict with science. They are so, the narrative 
continues, because they are opposed to scientific claims, since religion has a different 
way of knowing facts about the world. The common conception is that religion 
ultimately determines truths about the natural world through supernatural revelation 
and science ultimately determines truth through observation and reason. This is what I 
have termed systemic knowledge conflict between religion and science…The reason 
this systemic knowledge conflict view is common, as I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, is 
that most academics, and especially those who focus on the “religion and science 
debate”, assume it is so, and broadcast these views to the public (Evans 2018, 160). 
 
If it has long been a widespread assumption in the modern Western world that religious 
believers are in fundamental conflict with science because its systemic knowledge claims are 
incompatible with religious claims (and vice versa), then this is because it is what the elites 
believe, not necessarily the members of the religious public themselves. So what does the 
public believe? Evans’ answer to this question occupies the heart of the book (especially 
Chapters 6 and 7, which present the main empirical data from social surveys), where he 
demonstrates that the religious public sees the conflict between science and religion primarily 
in moral terms, not as regarding knowledge. Moral concerns in bioethics, transhumanism, 
and the political activism of scientists are centre stage to the science-and-religion debate for 
the public, rather than the epistemological disputes about the nature of nature which so 
fascinate the academics. Even the creation-evolution debate, he explains, is at heart 
concerned with morals rather than with our knowledge of the natural world (Evans 2018, 84-
85). But as Evans repeatedly points out, if we simply look at how the elites – those who are 
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supposed to be the opinion-makers – construe the science-and-religion debate, then we will 
not see the whole picture: “This is not the perspective you will get from the theologians, 
scientists, and historians who currently dominate the discussion of religion and science, as 
they see the relationship – and thus any potential conflict – as primarily about knowledge” 
(Evans 2018, 102). Hence, Evans’ argument is that the widespread notion of systemic 
knowledge conflict between science and religion must be abandoned, at least for the 
American public. Quite simply, the elites have misread the situation, assuming that their own 
guild interests are shared by all and sundry. 
 
 
The “conflict myth” 
 
Evans is surely right about the public. His presentation of the empirical data charting public 
attitudes as focusing on moral questions in the science-and-religion debate is simply too 
persuasive to ignore. The elites have got it wrong when they assume that the science-and-
religion debate is all about conflicting knowledge claims. But at this point my questions 
begin, since my own perception of the elites in the science-and-religion world is that they are 
generally careful not to construe the debate in terms of conflict, whether of knowledge or 
moral claims. Let me outline five nuances in the elite position which (I feel) need to be 
accounted for.  
 
First, Evans’ is by no means alone in wanting to downplay the importance of systemic 
knowledge conflict between science and religion. In fact, most academics who work in the 
science-and-religion field have argued consistently and strenuously against the “conflict 
myth” since the field began. Peter Harrison’s recent Territories of Science and Religion 
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(2015) is a case in point which Evans himself cites (Evans 2018, 26), but there are other 
prominent examples, notably Ian Barbour’s ground-breaking activity from the 1960s to 
1990s, such as his Gifford Lectures which set out his celebrated fourfold typology (Barbour 
1990), and John Hedley Brooke’s Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives 
(1991). But these seminal works would only be the tip of the iceberg of publications from the 
last fifty years which argue that there is more to science and religion than conflict about 
knowledge claims. For that matter, Evans’ own book could be considered as one of the latest 
manifestations of this scholarly trend to discredit the “conflict myth”. Is Evans guilty of 
inconsistency here? Is he undermining his own argument against the conflict myth by 
attacking his fellow “elites” who are equally motivated to discredit the myth of knowledge 
conflict? No, I don’t think so, since Evans examines some of this work by his fellow elites, 
principally Ian Barbour, Alister McGrath, and John Polkinghorne (Evans 2018, 29-33). These 
figures may all be convinced that the notion of knowledge conflict between science and 
religion is, at best, only partially true, but Evans points out that their work on the relationship 
between science and religion still assumes that it is a “systemic knowledge relationship”, not 
a moral one (2018, 42-43). In other words, these elites may be against conflict, but in 
assuming that only knowledge is at stake, they miss the point about the public’s interest in 
moral conflict between science and religion. I partially agree with Evans here: as I mentioned 
above, part of my own uneasiness with the science-and-religion world stems from the fact 
that its construal of religion is too detached from the many and varied lived realities of 
religious belief, with little to no interest in ethics or praxis. Hence, I am sure that Evans is 
making an important point here in bringing moral conflict to the fore, a point which he 
grounds thoroughly in empirical data in this book. However, insofar as he suggests that elites 
(“and especially those who focus on the ‘religion and science debate’”; Evans 2018, 160) 
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broadcast a message of conflict between science and religion to the public, I would disagree, 
since I believe that the elites are, by and large, united against the message of conflict. 
 
Second, however, that last sentence itself needs to be nuanced further. The elites do not 
deliberately broadcast the message of conflict, but nevertheless they disseminate it 
nonetheless. For, in discussing the relationship between science and religion so tirelessly 
since at least the 1960s, these elites (including Evans, it must be added), tacitly perpetuate the 
notion of knowledge conflict, even if they mean to do precisely the opposite. To put it 
bluntly, there must be some truth to an intellectual position which refuses to resign quietly in 
the face of constant attacks on its hegemony by the experts. The trick for the experts should 
surely be, then, not to deny the reality of conflict (whether knowledge or moral, as many 
apologists in the science-and-religion debate do, with the common refrain that, “there is no 
conflict between science and religion”) but to determine under which circumstances it is true. 
And again we have Evans to thank for demonstrating that the notion of conflict between 
science and religion holds true in certain social circumstances in the United States where 
moral questions have come to the fore, and that these social circumstances and moral 
questions are more significant than the elites realise.  
 
But third, it is important to recognise the massive difficulties that have become apparent in 
attempts over the last fifty years to determine the relationship between science and religion. 
Although Barbour’s fourfold typology of conflict, independence, dialogue and integration is 
often taken as the starting point, each scholar who investigates the problem seems to find 
their own solution(s) to the relationship. To illustrate the variety here, a by-no-means-
exhaustive list of notable proposals for the relationship between science and religion could 
include Stephen Jay Gould’s NOMA (Non-Overlapping MAgisteria), Mikael Stenmark’s 
10 
(2010) fourfold typology of irreconcilability, reconciliation, independence, and replacement, 
Niels Henrik Gregersen’s (2014) octopus metaphor, and Ted Peters’ recent (2018) account of 
ten candidate models: scientism, scientific imperialism, theological authoritarianism, the 
evolution controversy; the two books; the two languages; ethical alliance; dialogue; 
naturalism; theology of nature. In fact, I suggest that Evans’ own contribution in Morals Not 
Knowledge effectively adds a further possibility to the list, that of moral conflict. Overall, the 
diversity of potential relationships between science and religion is bewildering, illustrating 
something of the truth behind the “complexity” thesis which is often attributed to John 
Hedley Brooke, or perhaps supporting Nancey Murphy’s (1996) suggestion that the exercise 
of determining a relationship should be seen as a form of “postmodern apologetics”. If there 
is an element of truth to the huge diversity here, then there is presumably no single correct 
answer (or set of answers) to the relationship between science and religion, but nevertheless 
scholars will still continue to advance possible answers because of a felt need that there is 
something in the air that needs to be resolved. What is that “something”? 
 
Here we come to my fourth nuance. Just as the endless methodological discussions in the 
academic science-and-religion field tacitly perpetuate the notion of conflict between science 
and religion without being able to hit on a realistic alternative that all can agree on, so there is 
a sense in which the field arose from the notion of conflict in the first place, and is dependent 
upon that notion for its continued existence. To see this, we need to examine the phenomenon 
of secularisation. Notoriously controverted and difficult to define, secularisation, like its 
related term secularism, seems to turn on the relativisation of traditional religious truth claims 
and practices (i.e. both knowledge and moral values), while (in comparison) scientific truth 
claims proceed unhindered. I realise that I run the risk of coming over as hopelessly naïve in 
discussing such matters with a sociologist, but my own understanding of the academic 
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science-and-religion field is that it has emerged in parallel with secularism and secularisation 
thought. The field relies upon, but exists to counteract, the widespread (and problematic) 
narrative that conflict between science and religion is inevitable in a secular culture: science 
will advance while religion as an alternative knowledge system will retreat until it all-but 
vanishes. Now Evans (2018, 67-68) himself looks at secularisation theory, and he describes 
recent work which indicates that secularisation does not rely upon systemic knowledge 
conflict between science and religion. This supports his thesis that the conflict should be seen 
in moral terms rather than knowledge. But nevertheless, there is still conflict here, insofar as 
religious values are seen to be under threat in modern secular society. Hence, it seems hard to 
escape the observation that, whether knowledge or moral values are at stake, the notion of 
conflict – and probably conflict between science and religion – is still deeply embedded in the 
public understanding of secularisation, which is presumably why elites continue to write 
articles against this notion (Brooke 2010). If so, the conflict myth acts at least partly as some 
kind of social construct to legitimate the notion that secular society is a reality in our modern 
world, which is why the conflict myth is so difficult to eradicate, despite the best efforts of 
many scholars (Evans 2018, 27). It is somewhat inevitable then, that an academic field which 
examines the relationship between science and religion should arise in self-consciously 
secular societies such as those of modern Western Europe, if not the United States too. I 
believe that Willem B. Drees touches on an important point when he suggests that,  
 
‘[R]eligion and science’ in the Western world can be viewed as a response to 
secularization, that is, a response to the claim that science provides a better 
understanding of the world and a response to the expectation that the problem-solving 
attitude of science-based technology and medicine is to be preferred over prayer or 
other religious responses. If tension between religious affinities and reliance on science 
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provides the incentive for ‘religion and science’, contributors may look for alternatives 
to the view that science replaces religion. ‘Religion and science’ in this context is 
driven by the perception of conflict (Drees 2010, 4). 
 
According to Drees, then, the science-and-religion field arose at least partly as a response to 
secularisation, as a felt need in our modern world to assert the legitimacy of religious belief 
in the face of scientific marginalisation, and to re-define the place of religion in society. It is 
therefore perhaps no surprise that so much science-and-religion activity is apologetic in form, 
even if it is a form of “postmodern apologetics” (Murphy 1996). But it does at least mean that 
the academic questions and interests cannot easily be detached from their context in secular 
society, insofar as they are interwoven with secularisation as a recognised feature of our 
modern world.  
 
And, fifth, if I am correct in my line of argument that the conflict myth is at least partly a 
social construct, then it means that academic attempts to construe the relationship between 
science and religion in absolute terms (whether concerning questions about knowledge or 
morals) are missing the mark, even if they meet a felt need among elites to be doing 
something to address the problem of the marginalisation of religion in the secular world. A 
more effective response, surely, is that adopted by Evans here, as well as by others such as 
the research groups led by Elaine Ecklund and Fern Elsdon-Baker, all of whom take a 
predominantly social-science perspective to the science-and-religion debate, seeing it more as 
a complex social phenomenon than an absolute relationship between two monolithic entities. 
Hence, while I believe that Evans makes an important advance in our understanding of 
conflict between science and religion by pointing to its moral dimension in the public sphere, 
I question the implication of his study that we are still dealing with a relationship between 
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science and religion, two discrete entities. Of course, this problem is implicit in the name of 
the academic field: “science and religion”, or “religion and science”. Merely to air the name 
is to suggest that its central problem is that of relating two distinct categories, even before the 
second problem of conflict rears its head. Another way of saying this is that, even though 
most scholars in the field are bridge-builders by disposition, and dislike the hegemony of the 
conflict myth, merely by suggesting that a bridge needs to be built we are admitting that there 
is a river to be crossed. The fundamental problem of science and religion is not the conflict 
myth then, and neither is it the question of whether the conflict should be seen in knowledge 
or moral terms, but it is the prior suggestion that there are two distinct entities that need to be 
related. I will expand upon this point in the next section. 
 
To summarise what I have discussed in this section: I suggest that Evans’ binary of 
elites/public is insufficiently subtle as it stands, especially in the way it acts to suggest that 
the elites propagate systemic knowledge conflict between science and religion against the 
moral conflict perceived by the public. I suggest that elites in the science-and-religion field 
are generally concerned not to propagate conflict (whether in knowledge or moral terms), 
although they inevitably do so in a tacit way because of the nature of the field and its place in 
secular society. They may fight against the notion of conflict, but it is an uphill battle, 
because conflict is embedded so deeply in our understanding of secular society and therefore 
in the public understanding of “science and religion” in the first place. Evans is surely right to 
show us that this conflict rears its head publicly and primarily in moral debates between 
science and religion, but I would like to defend the elites as themselves concerned to 
downplay conflict, and to investigate the very shapes of science and religion as repositories 
of knowledge (if not ethics and praxis), reflecting my fifth nuance above. It is this which I 




The two pyramids 
 
One of the main ways in which Evans maintains the distinctiveness of science and religion 
from each other – a distinctiveness with which I feel uneasy, as I have said above – is by 
setting them up in terms of two “hypothetical knowledge systems”. Evans (2018, 7-9) does 
this graphically by means of two pyramids, one which represents the way that science works, 
and the other the way that religious belief works. At the apex of each pyramid there is a 
fundamental and abstract justificatory principle with which all lower-level propositions in the 
system must be consistent, all the way down to the most concrete claims made in each 
system. For the science pyramid, Evans suggests that the abstract justificatory principle at the 
apex could be something like, “Facts Derived Through Observation and Reason”, while for 
religion it could be, “God Can Control Nature”. These two pyramids are crucial to Evans’ 
elites/public binary. As Evans says:  
 
Critically, academics and other elites generally hold to these knowledge systems of 
deductive belief for the issues that they focus upon. Moreover, I would describe the 
tasks of philosophy, theology, and science as making the vertical and horizontal links in 
pyramids as logically coherent as possible…Academics and other elites reason in this 
way because they exist in institutions that reward them for it…[C]ritically, members of 
the public are generally not rewarded for formulating logical structures that reach quite 
as high or have the same degree of coherence (Evans 2018, 8-9). 
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Thus, while the elites reason by means of the full vertical and horizontal extents of the 
pyramids, the public does not, since its members do not have the leisure or the interest to 
develop fully-logical hierarchical systems, and so they tend to assume that conflict occurs 
between the lower-level propositional statements and morality. As Evans (2018, 10) says, 
“people do not have the time, motivation, or desire to make their beliefs logically coherent in 
the way this model demands.” Elites, on the other hand, who do have the time and motivation 
– and are rewarded for it, Evans suggests – construe the science-and-religion debate in terms 
of two complete knowledge systems (two whole pyramids) which are logically incompatible 
on account of their distinct abstract justificatory principles. This is why, Evans believes, elites 
tend to see the science-and-religion debate in systemic terms regarding conflict over whole 
systems of knowledge claims, while the public sees it in lower-level terms, regarding specific 
propositions and specific moral issues.  
 
The two-pyramids metaphor is helpful in illustrating Evans’ point, but like the elites/public 
binary, I worry that it simplifies the issues too far, and goes too far in making science and 
religion out to be two distinct entities, like chalk and cheese. Of course, I am aware that many 
elites in the science-and-religion field counteract the conflict myth by attempting to make 
science look a lot like religion, and vice versa. This can be taken too far, but by the same 
token it can be taken too far in the other direction, and I worry that Evans’ two pyramids does 
just that. In teaching the science-and-religion field I have slowly become convinced that the 
most practical and meaningful way to approach the debate is to granularise it by asking 
“Which science? Which religion?” (or better still, “Which scientific question? Which 
religious belief?”).  
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Let me put this another way by looking at the pyramids. One of my questions about the 
pyramid metaphor/model concerns the difficulty of agreeing upon the apex-level statement 
from which all lower propositions in the pyramid flow. Deciding upon such a statement is by 
no means a trivial exercise in most fields of enquiry. If I have understood the pyramid 
metaphor correctly, the science pyramid presupposes that there is one “scientific method” at 
the apex which all of the empirical sciences at lower levels share, and which informs all of 
their lower-level results and propositions, or perhaps a shared commitment to 
“methodological naturalism”, as though that meant the same thing for all empirical sciences. 
Of course, all of these sciences share Evans’ commitment to “observation and reason” at the 
apex, but then so do most academic subjects, even those in the arts and humanities such as 
history (and, arguably, also theology and religion, depending upon how we construe 
“observation”). This is an infamous problem in philosophy of science, that of defining a 
meaningful “scientific method” which unites all of the empirical sciences and distinguishes 
them from other rigorous academic subjects, and so far an answer has proved elusive. My 
own research area, condensed-matter physics, is clearly a branch of physics, and therefore a 
“natural science”, but its day-to-day aims and objectives are sufficiently far removed from 
other branches of physics like theoretical cosmology that it is difficult to demonstrate the 
common ground beyond general hand-waving aspirations like “observation and reason” about 
physical matter which, in any case, tell us little about what makes physics work as an 
intellectual system, and what joins up all of its branches. If it is difficult enough to see what 
would need to be at the apex to join up all of the branches of physics meaningfully, it is still 
more difficult to incorporate other sciences into the pyramid, like biology and earth science. 
This is the great problem which stands behind the “Myth of the Unity of Science” (Dupré 
2004, 39-51), a tortuous issue in philosophy of science rather like that of determining a single 
“scientific method” which works for all beyond vague invocations of “observation and 
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reason”. Hence, as an elite in physics it is not clear to me that the empirical sciences can be 
meaningfully modelled by a single pyramid. Better perhaps, to have many pyramids, 
representing many distinct research areas in the sciences. And turning to the religion 
pyramid, I have further questions. I am unable to see why it requires a training in academic 
theology to realise that the lower-level concrete claims and propositions flow from the 
highest-level justificatory belief of a God who is in control of the universe. Indeed, this very 
same high-level belief has been cited to me many times by audiences when I have given 
popular-level talks about academic perspectives on the theology of miracles, my main 
research area in theology. My experience of the religious public – or at least those who attend 
talks on science and religion – teaches me that this kind of logical-hierarchical thinking is 
entirely familiar to them. Hence, I am unsure why Evans suggests that only academics think 
in these terms.  
 
Overall then, I am not altogether convinced by the the pyramid metaphor, at least for the 
sciences, since it does not appear to reflect the messy reality of the empirical sciences as they 
are done on the ground. One of my main niggles here is that I am simply unsure that any of 
the natural sciences – and still less the supposed “edifice” of science as a whole – can be 
described accurately as a logical-deductive system of belief. Religion, on the other hand, 
seems to be more amenable to such a treatment, and I am happy to concede that the pyramid 
metaphor is more successful for a religious system like Christianity, especially since it is 
based on certain “knowledge” claims from which flow its ethical teachings.  
 
And this is why I question Evans’ belief that there is a clear distinction between the way that 
elites access the religion pyramid compared to the religious public. Evans cites Robert 
Wuthnow here, as arguing that religious people (i.e. the public) “do not use high-level 
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concepts to justify lower-level beliefs” (Evans 2018, 98), since they are more likely to use 
parables, narratives and personal stories to inform their ethical thinking. I am not qualified 
myself to speak of religions beyond Christianity (and even then only in its 
Episcopalian/Anglican/Catholic guises), and I am unsure of what empirical research stands 
behind Wuthnow’s claim, but my personal experience of Christians leads me to question 
whether his sweeping assertion captures the whole truth. This is because Wuthnow’s claim 
appears (to me) to underestimate the all-pervasive importance of the incarnation of Christ for 
Christians at personal, existential and experiential levels. In brief, the person of Jesus 
provides the source of the highest-level deductive principles to the lowest-level propositions, 
parables, stories, maxims, and motivations for individual morality. For instance, a Christian is 
quite likely to see her religion as a deductive system beginning with the justificatory claim at 
the apex that Jesus is the Son of God, consistent with the slightly lower-level narratival 
statements from the church’s creeds and Bible (and still concerning knowledge) that Jesus 
was born of the Virgin Mary, lived and taught on earth before dying, rising again, and being 
taken up to heaven. And this is exactly why such a Christian would feel that she should 
respect Jesus’ teachings (many of which are couched in parables and open-ended stories), to 
the extent that she should (now at the bottom of the pyramid) apply them to her life where 
possible. For a Christian, the person of Jesus is ubiquitous: he appears at every level of the 
pyramid because of his incarnation (the apex-level statement). This is why I can see the 
religious public thinking in this deductive way as much as academic theologians, not least 
because I have heard such deductive systems laid out in many churches in many sermons 
(admittedly delivered by elites), and have heard ordinary Christians repeat the same 
systematic thinking in discussion about their personal faith. I realise that Evans is 
summarising a great body of Wuthnow’s work here, and I realise that I am perhaps 
confirming his point that elites like me do not understand the public, but his claim that only 
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academics in the science-and-religion field think in a deductively-logical way about religion 
while the religious public does not is so important to Evans’ thesis that I suggest it needs 
further clarification. Christianity comes with a built-in deductive system which (I think) all 
believers would acknowledge in their own way, on account of the special theological role of 
the incarnation in Christianity, in fusing metaphysics, epistemology, narrative history and 
ethics into one flowing movement. (Evans is surely right, though, to explain that the task of 
theology and philosophy is to make the links in the pyramid as logically coherently as 
possible, and this would certainly be true of systematic theology par excellence; 2018, 8).  
 
But despite my misgivings about the pyramid metaphor, I feel that Evans has introduced a 
helpful way of discussing the issues here, which will surely be fruitful as we continue to 
debate the role of science and religion as an academic field, and its impact on public thinking 
and acting.  
 
 
Science and religion as natural theology 
 
Where I think that the pyramid model is particularly insightful comes in Evans’ treatment of 
how the theologically-minded elites in the science-and-religion field – the “theological 
science-religion synthesizers”, as he calls us (2018, 27) – think. For here, Evans (2018, 28) 
explains that these particular elites, “assume that the relationship between religion and 
science concerns systemic knowledge, and therefore any conflict is due to the failure to 
synthesize the fact claims of religion and science into one hierarchically structured logically 
coherent pyramid.” I am with Evans all the way here, especially since his pyramid metaphor 
offers such a useful way of picturing what is going on. I, and many of my fellow theological 
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synthesisers (at least in Christianity), do not think of science and religion as two discrete 
knowledge systems, and certainly not as two discrete pyramids based on mutually-exclusive 
deductive principles, but as one pyramid where the apex is a statement like “Jesus is the Son 
of God”, and which incorporates the empirical sciences lower down, together with other 
human sources of knowledge and practice. Whether science itself can be envisaged as one 
pyramid or many is less important to me than the fact that Christian belief can be envisaged 
as one universal and all-encompassing pyramid, where the sciences are inserted at various 
points lower down to form some (but by no means all) of the vertical and horizontal links. 
Just to give one example, take the Thomistic scheme of causation, where God as Creator is 
the primary cause behind every natural (secondary) cause in the world. This provides a 
theological way of explaining how the success of the natural sciences in determining laws of 
nature flows from a higher-level justificatory principle where the divine lawgiver, God, is the 
primary cause of nature and all of its effects. Not only does such a scheme provide a way of 
fashioning the Christian pyramid around all of the empirical sciences, and joining up its 
causative links, but it also provides explanatory justification for a great metaphysical mystery 
which the sciences themselves cannot answer, namely why the sciences are so successful in 
explaining the world. 
 
For this reason, at least some of us in the science-and-religion world steer away from the 
language of “synthesising” and “harmonising” which Evans uses of us. As I have said earlier, 
this smacks to me of two monolithic entities, “science” and “religion”, being brought 
together. Many of us simply do not see things in this binary way, since it does not appear to 
us that we are dealing with anything like C. P. Snow’s “two cultures”, so much as one 
culture. But in attempting to define this one culture, we also realise that we are doing nothing 
new. The tradition of natural theology in the centuries before Darwin, which is so often 
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caricatured today as a collection of outmoded “arguments from design”, was not only a rich 
source of inspiration for many early modern scientists, but also a way of providing 
metaphysical/theological justification for their scientific work, since there was often no easy 
distinction between “science” and “religion”. In many ways, the theologically-flavoured work 
which goes on in today’s science-and-religion world is the contemporary successor to that 
tradition of natural theology (although the term itself has largely fallen out of use).  
 
Much more could be said here, since this is the starting point for contemporary work which is 
developing theologies of nature, theologies of science, and “science-engaged theology”. 
Suffice it to say that practitioners here are unlikely to see science and religion in terms of 
monolithic entities, or distinct logical systems, and still less as systems in logical conflict. 
These practitioners are, though – and here Evans is certainly right – likely to be focussed on 
knowledge claims, but I suggest that this is at least as much because of the special role of the 
incarnation in Christianity as it is because of neglect by the academics in the moral questions 
of the public. These academics, I suggest, are most interested in taking the ancient tradition of 
natural theology, and making it work for today. They are academics being academics, in 
other words, advancing human frontiers by revisiting, recasting and revising the knowledge 





John H. Evans has written an important book for academics working in science and religion; 
something of a wake-up call. His book demonstrates lucidly the enormous mismatch between 
the academic and public perceptions of the science-and-religion debate. If many of us in the 
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field have wondered in the past why its ethical dimensions have been so poorly explored, 
Evans’ book provides us with an explanation for that deficit and a challenge for us to make 
good. I have suggested some ways in which Evans’ character portrayal of the elites misses 
the mark, not so much to blunt the edge of his criticism, as to suggest ways in which it may 
be made more incisive. A challenge of this order needs to find its mark, and I suggest that this 
book would find its mark more readily if the academic field was defined more clearly.  
 
Hence, in the interests of clarity, I should summarise what I have said. First, I have 
questioned whether the elites/public binary does the work that Evans needs it to do. My own 
perception of the elites is that they are concerned to qualify the hackneyed-conflict myth as 
much as he is. Evans is surely right though, that in failing to engage with the public’s 
perception of moral conflict between science and religion the elites are failing in their remit 
to engage with the needs of wider culture (at least in the American context which is under the 
microscope here). Second, I have argued that the notion of “conflict” is considerably more 
nuanced than Evans’ thesis suggests, as is the very idea of “science and religion” in the first 
place. There is much here that would benefit from further research, especially the ways that 
the academic science-and-religion field is entangled with secularisation thought, which surely 
indicates the massive importance of further sociological work like that which Evans has 
given us. Third, I have questioned Evans’ construal of the academic perception of science and 
religion as distinct knowledge systems. My feeling is that, like the elites/public binary, the 
two-pyramids binary also does not do the work that Evans needs it to do. I argued that 
knowledge claims are rather more fundamental to both the public and academic perceptions 
of religion than he suggests, at least in Christianity, and that this is why many academics in 
the science-and-religion world continue to focus them. Insofar as the science-and-religion 
field is the branch of the academic subject of theology which grapples at first hand with 
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modernity and secularism, it is natural that it should engage with knowledge claims first and 
foremost. It is not that the theological elites are disinterested in the public’s focus on morals, 
more that their focus as academics is on fundamentals: the principles before the practice, in 
effect. Still, this is no excuse for the field to continue to fail so comprehensively to engage 
with issues of practice (which are also, of course, of academic interest, especially to 
ethicists), and we have Evans to thank for drawing this to our attention. 
 
It has been a great privilege to grapple with John’s book, and I am grateful to both the 
editorial team of Zygon, and to John himself for this opportunity to think outside of my 
habitual box(es) in physics and theology. I know that I have posed many questions to John, 
many of which are no doubt naïve from a sociological perspective, and I look forward to 
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i The quotation derives from a TV interview with the Conservative politician and leading 
voice of Brexit, Michael Gove (broadcast on Sky News on 3rd June 2016). Here is the full 
sentence of what Gove said: “I think that the people of this country have had enough of 
experts from organisations with acronyms saying that they know what is best and getting it 
consistently wrong, because these people are the same ones who got consistently wrong…” 
Gove is cut off at this point by the interviewer 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA – last accessed 1st January 2019). 
                                                 
